Semantic search

This thesis is a study of Nartang monastery in the Tsang region of Central Tibet. Nartang monastery was founded in 1153 and was one of the most influential monastic institutions of the Kadam school until the fifteenth century. In its initial construction, Nartang monastery was a small enclave with limited members. By the mid-thirteenth century the place had significantly grown in physical size, membership, and reputation. This study explores the steady growth and decline of the monastery by examining the lives of the people in charge and their real and symbolic relations within and without the monastic community.

This thesis begins with the Kadam school in the Penyül valley of Central Tibet. Here Nartang’s founder Tumtön Lodrö Drakpa (Gtum ston blo gros grags pa, 1106-1166) was educated and inspired to return to his native land in Tsang to build Nartang monastery. I then turn to the effective campaign strategies of Nartang’s fourth, fifth, and sixth abbot, who traveled throughout Central Tibet to raise funds for the monastery and to acquire new monastic recruits. Nartang monastery was at its best during the tenure of the seventh abbot Chim Namkha Drak (Mchims nam mkha’ grags, 1210-1285). It was during his tenure that the political events on the Eastern Steppe could no longer be ignored in Central Tibet. I show how Chim Namkha Drak and the Nartang community effectively navigated through the Mongolian (re)organization of Central Tibet. I also trace how the Nartang abbots, specifically the eight abbot Kyotön Mönlam Tsültrim (Skyon ston smon lam tshul krims, 1219-1299), projected and guided the increasing importance of their monastery at the center of the Buddhist world. I then study the life of Nartang’s tenth abbot, his time spent at the Mongol court and his eventual return to Nartang. Finally, I look to Nartang when Gendün Drupa (Dge ’dun grub pa, 1391-1474), posthumously the First Dalai Lama, entered the monastery at the age of seven in 1398. By this time Nartang monastery had well established a standardized curriculum and built a reputation for itself as a preeminent Kadam scholastic institution. I also explore the various factors that left Nartang monastery in a precarious state by the fifteenth century, such as the burgeoning reformist movement in Central Tibet lead by Tsongkhapa Lozang Drakpa (Tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419), the building of Tashi Lhünpo monastery by Gendün Drupa in 1449, and a decline in Sakya power and the rise of the Pakmodrupa. (Source: UVa Online Archive)

This study examines The Seven Siddhi Texts, a short corpus of tantric Buddhist works that the Tibetan tradition identifies as the mahāmudrā transmission from the famed semimythical land of Oḍiyāna. Owing to the nature of the corpus itself, this study is best characterized as properly Indo-Tibetan in its scope. The Seven Siddhi Texts are first examined here as independent treatises that reflect the development of Vajrayāna Buddhism in its Indic cultural and historical contexts between the eighth and tenth centuries. They are then approached as a means for examining the formulation of Vajrayāna institutions and their attendant corpora in Nepal. Finally, they provide a case study in the phenomenon of practical canonicity in their employment in mahāmudrā polemical literature in Tibet from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries.

Part I argues for the adoption of a demonological paradigm in the study of South Asian religions. Using data from The Seven Siddhi Texts in dialogue with the  yurvedic discipline of demonology (bhūtavidyā), it highlights that Vajrayāna Buddhist traditions maintained a dual apotropaic-soteriological goal in their conception of the practice of yoga.

Part II addresses the sociological implications of sect and sectarian identity in The Seven Siddhi Texts. It presents the phenomenon of dissimulative asceticism in Vajrayāna Buddhism as a potential social context for the highly Śaiva-Buddhist hybrid forms of ritual that emerged with the Buddhist yoginītantras. It then addresses the issue of inclusivist and exclusivist expressions of sectarian identity from the authors of The Seven Siddhi Texts.

Part III discusses the formulation and transmission of The Seven Siddhi Texts as a corpus of mahāmudrā works in light of the broader phenomenon of practical canonicity in Buddhist traditions. It presents philological evidence that The Seven Siddhi Texts were part of a known mahāmudrā practical canon in Nepal prior to their transmission to Tibet. It then discusses historical data and Tibetan historiography on their transmission to Tibet beginning in the eleventh century. It concludes with a discussion of The Seven Siddhi Texts' incorporation into two Kagyü mahāmudrā practical canons in Tibet at the turn of the sixteenth century, and the role that The Seven Siddhi Texts played in a number of mahāmudrā polemical works composed by the subsequent generation of Kagyü authors.

Abstract

This dissertation studies the role purity (dag pa) plays in 14th-century Longchen Rabjam’s (klong chen rab 'byams) presentation of the Great Completeness (rdzogs chen). In service of this aim, I rigorously consider the semantic field of purity and its impact on our contemporary understanding of the Great Completeness. I specifically consider four major themes related to purity: space, non-change, luminosity, and effort. In doing so, my analysis builds on existent scholarship on the Great Completeness, highlighting how understanding Longchen Rabjam’s usage of purity elucidates often misunderstood elements of this contemplative system. Taken comprehensively, the semantic field of purity consists of a broad and remarkably diverse spectrum of attributes, each of which are employed by Longchenpa in service of describing the Great Completeness. In this way, I contend that purity is a vital lens for understanding Longchenpa’s presentation of the Great Completeness and its critical shift in emphasis from the ethical to the epistemological.

Abstract

The thesis concerns the recent debate in Thailand over the nature of nibbāna (nirvāṇa), the unconditioned, whether it is attā (self) or anattā (not-self).
      Western Buddhist studies, especially of recent years, have assumed that Theravāda Buddhism staightforwardly teaches the doctrine of anattā: that Theravāda Buddhism rejects attā in all respects, including in the ultimate sense. However, as the well-known debate in Thailand, which reached its zenith in 1999, has shown, there appears to be a significant minority of Theravāda monks, respected by significant numbers of Theravāda laity, arguing that nibbāna is attā.
      This debate can be seen as a manifestation of the Buddhist controversies over the understanding and implications of the anattā doctrine, but argued in the perspectives of contemporary Thai Theravāda Buddhism. As it was carried out mainly in Thai language publications of various sorts and makes extensive references from Thai version of the Pāli Tripiṭaka, this thesis is therefore intended to make use of my fluency in Thai language to bring to light and present something of the history and arguments that inform this debate. What I have chosen to do is to present in summary, with comment, two important Thai contributions to the debate, namely, Dhammakāya Case by P.A. Payutto, which argues that nibbāna is anattā, and, The Principle of Examination of Nibbāna-dhātu According to the Words of the Buddha and the Aṭṭhakathā by Phutthathamprathip, which argues that nibbāna is attā.
      After comparing this debate to the Tibetan Rang Stong and Gzan Stong dispute, it is concluded that they reveal two similar trends found in the history of Buddhist thought, one positing a substantial absolute beyond all conceptualization, and the other rejecting all kinds of substantial absolute. Both trends are found at various points in the history of Buddhism in different traditions.

Abstract

The Gaganagañjaparipṛcchā is the eighth chapter of one of the great canonical collections of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the Mahāsaṃnipāta, but it also acts as an individual text, or sūtra. As such, it is a dharmaparyāya, which dates back to the first or second century CE. The original Sanskrit has been lost, but there are three full-length translations in Tibetan and Chinese.
      This text is regarded as an important canonical scripture throughout the history of Buddhism, playing an important role in the development of the Mahāyāna Buddhist ideas. This is clearly documented by the fact that the Gaganagañjaparipṛcchā was translated into Tibetan (about 800 CE), and at least twice into Chinese (421 and 757 CE), and the sūtra was quoted by many of the great ācāryas of in India, Tibet, China, Korea and Japan. However, the text has received little scientific attention in modern times, and one of the reasons for this is that there is no full Sanskrit text available, only fragments from various later commentaries.
      The purpose of this study is, therefore, to carry out a basic research project consisting of making an English translation of the text, as well as examining its intertextuality and metaphorical implications. For this purpose, the dissertation has collected all available sources, including various versions of Tibetan, Chinese and fragmentary Sanskrit quotations. The primary text of the English translation is the Derge edition of the Tibetan Kanjur. The English translation, the Tibetan and the two Chinese texts are arranged as a parallel edition. As for the translation, the hypothetical Sanskrit passages is to some extent reconstructed.
      In the introduction, all the sources have been historically and critically evaluated. The introduction also contains a treatment of the main ideas of the text and their contextual position within the Mahāyāna Buddhist literature. In this way, the study shows that the philosophy and history of the Gaganagañjaparipṛcchā are related to other important texts from the Mahāyāna Buddhism, among them the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā and the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, and thus that Gaganagañjaparipṛcchā is closely related to these two works and a number of others.

Abstract

By comparing the instances of the Māra mytheme in the narratives of the prajñā-pāramitā-sūtras with those found in non-Mahayana texts, this thesis explores how this vitally important persona, one central to the narrative account of the bodhisattva quest for awakening, developed from earlier mythic prototypes. Pali sources identify a number of alternative identities for Māra the most significant of which being Namuci, an asura who took control over the mind of Indra. Using linguistic ideas originally developed by Saussure, the storylines of the Māra and Namuci myths can be reduced to a simple, common narrative statement or syntagm. Adopting this approach demonstrates how apparently new narratives can be derived through the application of paradigmatic changes within that syntagm. Furthermore, drawing upon the findings of historical linguistics, it was possible to interpolate potential Proto-Indian-European origins for the Māra mytheme. Rather than supporting the traditionally accepted view of Māra as an allegory for death, this enabled the signification of the actual name Māra to be seen as pointing towards a 'grinding-away' or oppression of the mind. This was achieved by relating the Māra of Buddhist mythology with the mare-hag common to a number of IndoEuropean folklores. Support for this argument is also found in Pali narratives which depict Māra entering the thoughts of others engaged in meditation during the night in order to induce feelings of fear and uncertainty. Finally, based upon these findings, it was possible to scrutinize the narrative and nested tales of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra in its earliest recension, the Dàoxíng Bōrě Jīng, and identify how the original Māra myth underwent structured, paradigmatic modifications that reflect a bodhisattva's progress towards final awakening.

Abstract

This thesis aims to provide a comprehensive study of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka with specific emphasis on the bodhisattva ideal. The content of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka indicates that its exposition belongs to the earliest treatises on the bodhisattva. The practices and doctrines that are expounded are invariably rudimentary and show little of the complexities that characterise their discussions in later bodhisattva literature. The Bodhisattvapiṭaka's inclusion into the Mahāratnakūṭa rested probably on its pioneering account of the bodhisattvacaryā. Being by far the longest work on the bodhisattva in the whole collection, it expounds important practices and constitutes the hub for the remaining bodhisattva writings in the Mahāratnakūṭa.
      The study falls into five parts. The first chapter considers the position of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka in Mahāyāna literature. It investigates the various usages of the term Bodhisattvapiṭaka, it considers the relationship between the Bodhisattvapiṭaka and Akṣayamatinirdeśa and discusses the scholastic affiliation of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka. In addition, exploring the contents and evolution of the Mahāratnakūṭa collection, it establishes the scriptural context in which the Bodhisattvapiṭaka is placed. The second chapter provides an analysis of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka. It examines the structural and literary traits of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka, its chapter organisation and some aspects of the bodhisattva path in the Bodhisattvapiṭaka. Chapter three discusses the bodhisattva ideal in the Mahāratnakūṭa collection. It distinguishes between the various categories of bodhisattva sutras in the Mahāratnakūṭa, it examines the bodhisattva practices and investigates whether there is evidence of a premeditated design that might have influenced the compilation of the Mahāratnakūṭa sūtras into one collection. Chapter four considers the bodhisattva doctrine as it is propounded in the Bodhisattvapiṭaka within the context of other scriptural traditions. It discusses the evolution of the concepts of the cittotpāda, apramaṇa, pāramitā and saṃgrahvastu and assesses the contribution of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka to that process. Chapter five consists of a translation of the eleventh chapter of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka.

Abstract

The Bodhisattvapiṭaka-sūtra is a work included in the large sutra collection, the Mahāratnakuṭa, compiled by Bodhiruci in the beginning of the eighth century. The history of the Ratnakuṭa collection is obscure, but a review of available evidence seems to indicate that the collection was compiled no earlier than the fourth century and no later than the sixth century. The translation of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka-sūtra into Chinese was done by Hsüan-tsang in 645 from a Sanskrit manuscript brought with him from India. A second version was done by the later Dharmarakṣa between 1004 and 1053. The Hsüan-tsang version is considerably longer than the Dharmarakṣa version, to which it is superior. The difference in length, however, is accounted for by a wordier style and the use of introductory, recapitulative and concluding phrases in the longer version which do not significantly alter the contents of the sutra, if we base our judgement on comparison of the dhyāna chapters of the two versions.
      The term "Bodhisattva-piṭaka" has a wide currency in Mahāyāna Buddhist literature, and is thought by some scholars to refer to a collection which actually existed in early Mahāyāna of works concerned with the Bodhisattva practice. There are instances of the term which support this view, but the term "Bodhisattva-piṭaka" is also often used simply to indicate scriptures of the Mahāyāna.
      The dhyāna chapter of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka-sūtra begins with a formulaic passage on the four dhyānas and then deals at length with the five abhijñās or supernormal faculties. This description comprises about half of the chapter. The remainder praises the dhyāna of the Bodhisattva, his aid of sentient beings and his spiritual knowledge, and ends with a verse section. Translations of both versions of the chapter, with notes, form Part Three of the dissertation. The Chinese texts, reproduced from the Taisho Tripiṭaka, are furnished in an Appendix.
      A number of texts on dhyāna were examined for purposes of comparison with the dhyāna chapter of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka-sūtra. These were Saṇgharakṣa's Yogacarabhūmi, Asaṅga's Śrāvakabhūmi, and Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga, as "Hinayana"-oriented treatments of dhyāna, and as works which included a treatment of dhyāna within that of the group of pāramitās, the verses on dhyāna of the Ratnaguṇasamcayagatha and the Dharmasamuccaya, the dhyāna chapters of Āsaṅga's Bodhisattvabhūmi, Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra, and Ārya-Śūra's Pāramitāsamāsa, and portions of Śāntideva's compendium, the Śikṣāsamuccaya.
      This comparison showed a great variety in treatments of dhyāna in Buddhist literature, which we have roughly categorised as "Hinayana" and "Mahayana" in style. The "Hinayana" approach, is technical and expository, explaining methods of dhyāna for the practitioner, while the "Mahayana" approach emphasises the fact that the Bodhisattva practices dhyāna in order to aid sentient beings, and in extolling the Bodhisattva path may say relatively little about the practice of dhyāna as such. These two "phases" of the treatment of dhyāna occur together in certain works, and it seems that Buddhist writers did not feel them to be mutually inconsistent. The dhyāna chapter of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka-sūtra is almost entirely Mahayana in the style of its treatment of dhyāna. An assessment of its distinguishing qualities and its position in Buddhist tradition awaits further comparison with Mahayana sutra literature as well as commentarial and verse works such as those discussed here.

Abstract

This dissertation is a comparative analysis of compassion cultivation in Indo-Tibetan Mahāyāna Buddhist contexts and the recent phenomenon of secular, Buddhism-derived compassion training in North America, exemplified by one of the most prominent programs to date, the Compassion Cultivation Training (CCT) developed at Stanford University.
      This dissertation makes a contribution to the little-studied field of Buddhist compassion cultivation by tracing the transformations of important key concepts throughout Indian and Tibetan Buddhist intellectual history, highlighting the ways in which these transformational processes have enabled the contemporary secularization of compassion training. The study also clarifies conceptual discrepancies between traditional Buddhist and secular approaches to compassion training, particularly focusing on the compassion culture in which the respective training methods are embedded. The study thereby raises awareness of the scope and limitations of the secularization of Buddhist contemplative practices.
      The critical comparative analysis is based on textual interpretation of relevant texts from various genres, such as Indian Mahāyāna sūtra, Abhidharma, Tathāgatagarbha, Yogācāra and Madhyamaka śāstra, Tibetan commentarial texts and practice manuals of the Lojong (blo sbyong) and Lamrim (lam rim) traditions, as well as recent scientific studies of mindfulness and compassion. The choice of textual material is determined by its relevance for the evolution of compassion cultivation, culminating in its secularization in contemporary North America.
      The study begins with a broad overview of etymologies, definitions and ideas pertaining to compassion in canonical Mahāyāna literature, which are contrasted with definitions drawn from contemporary secular compassion science literature, thereby setting the stage for a comparative analysis. Then I discuss compassion didactics in sūtra and śāstra literature and propose a systematization of three didactic approaches, namely, constructive, deconstructive and cognitive-analytic. I argue that these three didactic styles must be understood as embedded in a contextual framework, a “compassion culture.” The study then focuses on the specific method of tonglen, which is the formal contemplative method in both, Tibetan Lojong and secular CCT. I trace its philosophical roots to the principle of “equalizing and exchange of self and other” (Skt. svaparasamatā parātmaparivartana, Tib. bdag gzhan mnyams brje), which has been extensively developed by the seventh-century Indian master Śāntideva in his Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra. The analysis of various Tibetan interpretations thereof shows how this meditation was progressively transformed and popularized, thereby paving the way for its secularization in CCT. After a detailed presentation of the secular program of CCT, I discuss the complex relationship to its Buddhist roots and conclude with a critique of the recent phenomenon of secularized Buddhist contemplative practice.

Abstract

This dissertation presents, in two parts, a study of the life and works of the Indian Buddhist philosopher, teacher and litterateur Candragomin, and the study and translation of his own and associated treatises on the bodhisattva vow.
      Taking the divisions in order: Part One is concerned with the life and works of Cg, beginning with a chapter on his date. Adducing new evidence and applying modern methodology to this controversial topic, it is determined that Cg, the University of Nalanda philosopher known to Tibetan and Chinese traditions, lived in the last three quarters of the seventh century, and that all the sixty-odd works attributed to him in the Tibetan canon may in fact be his, with the important exception of the Candra system of Sanskrit grammar.
      Chapter Two studies the role played by Cg, in the traditional Tibetan accounts of his life, as exponent of Yogācāra philosophy and personification of the lay bodhisattva ideal. Chapter Three is a translation of Cg's fifty-one verse Praise in Confession (Deśana-stava) with its commentary (vṛtti) by Buddhaśānti , from the Tibetan translation. Semi-autobiographical in nature, this poem surveys the standard doctrines and practices of Buddhism in one of its most productive eras, an unusually candid and informative account of the problems encountered by a layman in his attempts at religious practice. Working in the high poetic (kāvya) style, Cg and his commentator apply, to his own life, the theoretical principles set forth in his Twenty Verses on the Bodhisattva Vow. The introductory remarks and annotation examine the methods of Rin-chen bzang-po (958–1055), dean of Tibetan translators, and the English rendering is a prototype for the translation of kāvya from a Tibetan version.
       Part Two consists of a translation from the Tibetan (with reference to the parallel Sanskrit passages of Asaṅga) of Cg's didactic and historically important work on the bodhisattva vow (the Bodhisattva-saṁvara-viṁśaka)—a mnemonic condensation of the Chapter on Morality (śīla-paṭala) of the Bodhisattva-bhūmi—with the commentary upon it by the ninth century philosopher Śāntarakṣita. An introductory essay probes the bodhisattva figure as described in these and in later exegetical and synoptic treatises—especially in the "Three Vows" genre developed in Tibet upon late Indian models—the bodhisattva's aspirations and his means of fulfilling them, as distinguished from the aspirations and methods of "lesser vehicle" Buddhism. The importance of these works in understanding the ideals of the Greater Vehicle, as expressed in the moral code of the bodhisattva and the definition of his social relationships, cannot be underestimated. This dissertation is the first extensive study of bodhisattva morality, and of the ceremony for taking the bodhisattva vow, as it is elaborated in Yogācāra literature. The introductory essay also explores the role of the Viṁśaka and its commentary in the introduction of Buddhism into Tibet by Śāntarakṣita.
      Detailed annotation to the translation incorporates bibliographical data and exegetical material drawn chiefly from scriptural (sūtra ) sources of the Chapter on Morality, commentaries to it by Guṇaprabha, Jinaputra and Samudramegha, and commentaries to the Twenty Verses itself by Bodhibhadra and Grags-pa rgyal-mtshan. The Byang-chub gzhung-lam of Tsong-kha-pa (1357–1419) has been quoted at length for its lucid and comprehensive account of reasoning upon these subjects by the various authors, teachers and schools of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism.
      Seven appendices to the dissertation include edited Tibetan texts and the translation of subsidiary literature on the bodhisattva vow.

No abstract given. The following are the first relevant paragraphs:

The Buddhist canon contains a substantial amount of material that treats the subject matter of ethics. Topics addressed in these texts include how we should live our lives, how we should treat others, classifications of right and wrong actions, and the articulation of virtues to be cultivated and vices to be avoided. The abundance of Buddhist material treating ethical issues even led O.H. de A. Wijesekera (1971) to make the grandiose claim, "It is universally recognized that Buddhism can claim to be the most ethical of all religio-philosophical systems of the world" (p. 49). Charles Goodman (2009) describes Buddhist ethics with its emphasis on non-violence and compassion as one of most appealing parts of the teachings of Buddhism. He writes, "Many people have drawn inspiration from Buddhism's emphasis on compassion, non-violence, and tolerance, its concern for animals, and its models of virtue and self-cultivation" (p. 1). Damien Keown (1992) even argues that Buddhism itself is foremost an ethical project: "Buddhism is a response to what is fundamentally an ethical problem—the perennial problem of the best kind of life for a man (sic) to lead" (p. 1).
      It should be no surprise that ethics plays an important role in Buddhism, given its soteriological goal of an ideal state. Like many other religions, Buddhism calls for ethical conduct as a requirement for attaining its soteriological goal. The Buddhist canon includes extensive guidelines for conduct that foster the move from an ordinary state to an ideal state. Buddhist ethics, however, is not based on a theistic model: No omnipotent creator decrees what constitutes good and evil. Instead, I will argue that common themes underlying Buddhist ethical works are nested in the larger Buddhist project that sees suffering and its causes as the primary human existential problem. The distinction between good and bad, I will argue, depends entirely on the analysis of suffering and its causes. The Buddha explained in what Buddhists take to be his first teaching upon attaining enlightenment that it is confusion about ourselves and the world we live in that causes us to suffer, and that only knowledge of the reality of our world removes this confusion and frees us from suffering. The good, I will argue, is linked with this knowledge; the Buddhist soteriological goal of liberation from suffering is achieved not through faith, but through reason. Liberation is not a reward for ethical conduct, but is, as I aim to demonstrate in the coming chapters, the state of the morally mature person who experiences the world mediated by an accurate metaphysical understanding. (Aitken, general introduction, 1–2)

Abstract

Where do we locate the effects of monastic training? Are these located primarily in the interior of a person's psyche or on the exterior of the body? This thesis argues that according to the Śikṣāsamuccaya, a Sanskrit Buddhist compendium of monastic discipline, virtue is as much a feature of the body as it is an inner quality—a perception which has wide resonance in the Buddhist literature of many schools. Morality is persistently associated with the body in this text. Beings are adorned or perfumed with virtue; likewise they are disfigured by sin or reek with the stench of their immoral conduct.
      Chapters one and two demonstrate that monastic training centers on transforming the embodied subject, physically and morally. Chapter one examines the Sanskrit vocabulary for body. A central concern throughout the thesis is to demonstrate that mistranslation of technical vocabulary has obscured the body's significance in Buddhist literature. Chapter two describes the biological features which mark "virtuous bodies," such as beauty and health. It argues that the Śikṣāsamuccaya regards both body and morality as extraordinarily pliable—that is, capable of transformation through a broad range of monastic practices.
      Chapter three investigates the physical effects of eradicating the defilements (passion, anger, and delusion) attained by meditating on the body's foulness, impermanence, and lack of enduring essence. Elimination of defilements produces a Buddha's irresistibly beautiful body. The chapter argues that a philosophical analysis of the body (paramārthasatya) is in the service of an ethical perspective (saṃvṛtisatya). Attention is paid to the rhetorical function of gender in eradicating defilements.
      Chapter four investigates the effects of encounters with the virtuous bodies of Buddhas, bodhisattvas, and disciplined monks. In particular, the chapter explores how aesthetic, medical, and alchemical discourses suggest that bodhisattva bodies, which delight, heal, transmute, and purify living beings, transform others, physically and morally. Whereas chapter three explores the transformative effects of cultivating detachment from the body, chapter four examines the effects of attraction to certain kinds of bodies. The Śikṣāsamuccaya regards association with the virtuous bodies of others as highly productive of virtue.

Abstract

This dissertation examines the ethics of Śāntideva, an Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist thinker of the seventh century CE, particularly through his work, the Śikṣāsamuccaya (Compendium of Teaching). This study therefore helps redress a significant imbalance in the scholarship on Buddhist ethics, which has up to now focused primarily on the morality of the Theravada Buddhist tradition. The dissertation incorporates both descriptive and metaethical analyses to answer three questions: What is Śāntideva's moral theory, and how does it compare with other characterizations of Buddhist ethics? Can one moral theory adequately describe Buddhist moral traditions?
      Through textual analysis and translations, this thesis offers a exegetical account of the moral thought in the Śikṣasamuccaya, beginning with a description of Śāntideva's understanding of how to become a bodhisattva, the Mahāyāna spiritual ideal. I provide an analysis of Śāntideva's understanding of key moral concepts, with a particular focus on virtuous conduct (śīla), skillfulness (kuśalatvā), and merit (puṇya). I then test the assumption that Buddhist moral theory is homogeneous by comparing the results of this study with those of existing secondary literature on Buddhist ethics, and in particular, I respond to Damien Keown's position that Buddhist ethics can be considered a form of Aristotelian virtue ethics. I highlight those features of Śāntideva's thought that fit the framework of a virtue ethic, and then discuss the implications of those aspects of the tradition that are not well captured by it. In particular, I consider the utilitarian elements in Śāntideva's morality. In my conclusion, I attempt to resolve these apparently conflicting styles of moral reasoning with the idea that there is a shift over the course of a bodhisattva's career from a straightforward virtue ethic to a kind of utilitarian hybrid of virtue ethics. I conclude the thesis with some reflections on the value of comparative ethics and the effort to develop a comprehensive moral theory to describe Buddhist traditions.

Abstract

Human language is unfit to describe the content of the mystical experience; the conditions necessary to attain the desired goal, on the contrary, are much more easily susceptible to linguistic expression. This is the principal reason why mystics always deal at greater length with the via mystica than with the unio mystica. Therefore the specific nature of Buddhism can only become clear through an examination of its mystic way. During the whole history of Buddhism the way to Nirvana has been the core of the doctrine.[1]

The Buddha is credited with clearly and succinctly expounding the Buddhist path (mārga). Despite the eloquence and brevity of the Buddha's exposition, the corpus of Buddhist scriptures explaining the path is prolix.
      It is generally thought that the moral precepts (śikṣāpadas), correct practices (samudācāras) and restraints (saṃvaras) for a bodhisattva[2] are to be found in Mahāyāna sūtras. Yet it seems that the most likely outcome of reading these sūtras is not enlightenment, but confusion.[3] Mahāyāna sūtras appear too extensive and complex to be of much practical benefit to an incipient bodhisattva.
      This paper asserts that the Śikṣāsamuccaya (ŚS) and Śikṣāsamuccayakārikā (ŚSKā) are composed by Śāntideva (Ś) to counter the bewilderment which results from reading Mahāyāna sūtras. Both works explicate the essential principles (marmasthānas) of these sūtras for the benefit of a bodhisattva new to the way.
      Further, this paper asserts that of all the various practices described in Mahāyāna sūtras, Ś believes that the practice of giving (dāna ≡ utsarjana) is fundamental. In the ŚS and ŚSKā the way of the bodhisattva (bodhisattvamārga) is essentially the way of giving (dānamārga).
      In short, Ś expects a bodhisattva:

i) to give everything (sarva+√dā ≡ sarva+ut+√sṛj) in order to attain perfect enlightenment (samyaksaṃbodhi);

ii) to make a worthy gift of his person (ātmabhāva), enjoyments (bhogas) and merit (puṇya) in order to give everything;

iii) to preserve (√rakṣ), purify (√śudh), and increase (√vṛdh) his gift in order to make a worthy gift; and

iv) to practice the four right strivings (samyakpradhānas)[4] in order to preserve, purify and increase his gift.

      It is asserted in this paper, then, that Ś considers the unsurpassed and perfect enlightenment of the Buddha attained by the practice of complete giving (sarvadāna ≡ sarvotsarjana) and complete giving attained by the practice of the right strivings. This conception of the way of the bohisattva is represented in Figure 7.1[5] and in more detail in Figure 7.2[6].
      Overall, this paper attempts to provide a comprehensive analysis of the content, structure, theme and meaning of the ŚS and ŚSKā. To the knowledge of the present writer, it is the first of its kind.

Notes

1. De Jong, ‘Absolute’, pp. 58–59.
2. To reduce distraction bodhisattva & dharma(s) are not italicised. It is also to be noted that ‘bodhisattva’ is used in this paper as an abbreviation for ‘bodhisattva-maha ̄sattva’. Following Haribhadra (Wogihara, ‘Abhisamayālaṁkārāloka’, p. 22, lns. 13–16, quoted in: Kajiyama, ‘Philosophy’, p. 91; & Idem, ‘Meanings’, pp. 265–266) the present writer distinguishes between: a.) a bodhisattva who tries to attain his own interest (i.e., enlightenment); b.) a mahāsattva who tries to attain the interest of others; & c.) a bodhisattva-mahāsattva who is devoted to enlightenment both for himself and for others.
3. Cf. Bendall & Rouse, p. 17, lns. 5–12.
4. I.e., i.) the non production of non existing bad dharmas; ii.) the destruction of existing bad dharmas; iii.) the production of non existing good dharmas; & iv.) the increase of existing good dharmas.
5. P. 190.
6. P. 191.

Abstract

The Bodhicaryāvatāra has been studied by modern scholars from a number of angles; however, one aspect of it has been neglected: its practical use as a tool for Mahāyāna Buddhist practitioners. Buddhist literature has often been used as a tool for the process of bhāvanā ("meditation" or "cultivation"), a term which refers to a process of deliberate cultivation of specific attitudes such as renunciation or compassion. The Bodhicaryāvatāra is a typical example of such a text that is intended to be used a tool in this process. Furthermore, its first chapter, entitled the Bodhicittānuśaṃsapariccheda ("The Chapter on the Benefits of Bodhicitta"), in addition to being a tool for bhāvanā, is basically a short praise to bodhicitta and bodhisattvas. Thus it is to some extent an example of the genre of stotra ("(generally religious) praise"), which is a genre of Sanskrit literature ubiquitous in all Indian religious traditions as far back as we have documentation. In Part I I examine the way in which the genre of stotra fits into the more general use of literature as a tool of mental cultivation, with particular focus on the Bodhicittānuśaṃsapariccheda. I show that genres such as stotra are intimately linked with other less overtly ritualistic Indian religious literature in terms of their role in praxis, particularly the process of bhāvanā. I also show the way in which this relationship involves the concept of puṇya, or "merit," which figures in both the process of bhāvanā and in the genre of stotra. Part II consists of a translation of the first chapter of the only surviving commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra, Prajñākaramati's pañjikā.

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to study 'Santideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra.' I do not explore it in detail, but rather in general. The legendary biography of Santideva is included. The role of the text, Bodhicaryavātāra, and remarks on the text, made by various scholars throughout history, are also mentioned. The meaning of bodhi or bodhisattva is clarified to some degree. The bodhicaryas, the ways of the Bodhisattvas, are explained, such as Bodhicitta, the awakening mind; Pāramitās, perfections; and Bodhisattva-bhūmis, the stages of Bodhisattva.
      The summary of the Bodhicaryavātāra is also included. The last parts of the paper are brief studies of each chapter.

Abstract

Grounded in the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Śāntideva, this thesis is an exploration of the tension between the call of the suffering other and the care for the self. I argue that the asymmetrical ethics of compassion that prioritizes the suffering of the other over the concerns of the self is at the heart of Levinas's philosophy. While defending Levinas's understanding of the asymmetrical character of ethics, I have looked elsewhere for a solution to the problematic violence of Levinasian ethical subjectivity, in which the self is perpetually guilty, traumatized by the inescapable burden of a responsibility it cannot fulfill. To address this violence towards self while maintaining the asymmetrical ethics of compassion, I have drawn on Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra. Śāntideva’s account of subjectivity and ethics indicates a path of self-cultivation that develops compassionate attention to the suffering other. I have described and analyzed this path, emphasizing how it addresses the deepest needs of the self while simultaneously enabling a greater sensibility to the suffering of others and a greater capacity for the alleviation of their distress.

Abstract

This dissertation provides a comprehensive study and complete translation of Tao-sheng's Commentary on the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra (CSPS). This document occupies an important place in Chinese Buddhist literature. Its significance in the study of Chinese Buddhism can be described in two ways. Firstly, the CSPS was the first commentary ever written on the Lotus Sūtra, which was to become a scripture of fundamental importance on the Far Eastern Buddhist scene, especially for the later Chinese Buddhist schools. Furthermore, it was the first commentary on any Buddhist scripture that was written in Chinese and structured in fully developed commentarial form. The CSPS set a pattern in many ways for later Buddhists to follow in terms of both structure and ideology.
      Secondly, the CSPS is a rich source of Tao-sheng's seminal ideas. Tao-sheng (ca. 360-434) has been regarded, both in his time and subsequently, as a uniquely creative and prophetic thinker. The CSPS, the only writing of Tao-sheng preserved in complete form, is essential to any study of Tao-sheng's own original thought. Most of his theses and arguments, which were controversial in his day, were originally propounded in his other writings, but the commentary may provide at least the general structure of Tao-sheng's thought.
      The thesis is composed of two main portions: "Study" (Part I-IV) and "Translation" (Part V). Part I sets out and clarifies the problems involved in the study of Tao-sheng, the aims and method of the present study. Part II as the introductory step to the main task involving the CSPS extensively examines Tao-sheng as a whole as reflected in other sources, in terms of his background, historical and biographical, his works, his doctrines, and his influence. Part III is devoted to a critical examination of the CSPS proper. Here I undertake an in-depth analysis in several different ways in respect with both form and content, or language and ideology. The analysis focuses on how Tao-sheng renders, successfully or otherwise, the ancient Indian system of religious thought into the current Chinese language, which was already laden with indigenous philosophical connotations. Here I also trace and reconstruct Tao-sheng's thought incorporated in the commentary in accordance with his distinct themes. Part IV reviews the findings and significance of the study conducted. In brief, the thesis is the first full-scale study of Tao-sheng and the commentary.
      Finally, a complete translation of the text is presented along with detailed annotations including the classical sources of Chinese philosophical terms used and numerous corruptions of the text. In light of the significance of Tao-sheng and the CSPS, the translation answers the need for a complete translation of the text into a modern language and will serve as a basis for further study.

Abstract

Through a close examination on three Sanskrit compounds — i.e., tathāgatanairātmyagarbha, tathāgatagarbhālayavijñāna and pariniṣpannasvabhāvas tathāgatagarbhahṛdayam — in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, this thesis will demonstrate how the tathāgatagarbha thought in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra is significantly enriched by Yogācāric influence.
      First, in regard to tathāgata-nairātmya-garbha, a doctrinal review of the term "nairātmya" is necessary, because its definition differs according to different traditions. In primitive Buddhism, the term "nairātmya" is a synonym of the term "anātman" (non-existence of a substantial self), which indicates that in the realm of suffering and the impermanence of life phenomena that arise according to the principle of co-dependent origination/ pratītyasamutpāda, no eternal and dependent ātman can be found. According to the Madhyamaka School, the term "nairātmya" is a synonym of the term "niḥsvabhāva" (no intrinsic-nature) which implies that all beings, whether conditioned or unconditioned, are all devoid of an ever-abiding intrinsic nature. For the Yogācāra School, the reality of nairātmya is said to be grasped under the principle of mind-only. That is to say, the imagined self /kalpitātman that is the presentation of mind is unreal, while the indescribable self/ anabhilāpyātman that is the genuine mind itself is real. Finally, it can be said that the tathāgata-nairātmya-garbha in Laṅkāvatārasūtra accords well with the Yogācāra teaching. In other words, it is the Yogācāric sense of nairātmya that sheds an influence upon the tathāgatagarbha doctrine.
      Secondly, in regard to tathāgatagarbhālayavijñāna, a doctrinal development is promoted owing to the identification of tathāgatagarbha with ālayavijñāna, which according to the Yogācāra School is also named "sarvabīljavijñāna" (cognition as the seed of everything). This latter synonym references its function of bringing forth all beings just as a giant tree originates from a seed. As a result of its identification with the ālayavijñāna, the tathāgatagarbha is said to be endowed with the function of bringing forth all forms of existence and thus becomes the "producing cause" of all. This interpretation is not seen in earlier scriptures wherein the tathāgatagarbha is described simply as a static substance supporting all beings.
      Thirdly, in regard to pariniṣpannasvabhāvastathāgata-garbhahṛdayam, the implication of the tathāgatagarbha was expanded substantially by declaring that pariniṣpannasvabhāva is the very essence of tathāgatagarbha. The term "pariniṣpannasvabhāva" according to some important Yogācāra texts is defined as tathatā (ultimate realm of suchness). The combining of pariniṣpannasvabhāva with tathāgatagarbha that had formerly focused on the subjective potential of realizing wisdom, shifts the doctrinal emphasis toward the objective realm of realized perfection.
      This thesis reveals that, having assimilated the Yogācāric doctrine of dharmanairātmya, ālayavijñāna and pariniṣpannasvabhāva, the tathāgatagarbha thinking in Laṅkāvatārasūtra presents the comprehensive and distinctive features in comparison to the scriptures that preceded it.

Abstract

The present dissertation identifies the ontological presuppositions and the corresponding soteriological-epistemological principles that sustain and define the Mahāyāna Buddhist belief in the inherent potentiality of all animate beings to attain the supreme and perfect enlightenment of Buddhahood. More specifically, the study establishes a coherent metaphysic of Absolute Suchness (Tathatā), synthesizing the variant traditions of the Tathāgata-embryo (Tathāgatagarbha) and the Storehouse Consciousness (Ālayavijñāna).
      The dissertation interprets the Buddhist enlightenment as the salvific-transformational moment in which Tathatā "awakens" to itself, comes to perfect self-realization as the Absolute Suchness of reality, in and through phenomenal human consciousness. It is an interpretation of the Buddhist Path as the spontaneous self-emergence of "embryonic" absolute knowledge as it comes to free itself from the concealments of adventitious defilements, and possess itself in fully self-explicitated self-consciousness as the "Highest Truth" and unconditional nature of all existence; it does so only in the form of omniscient wisdom.
      Aside from Ruegg's La Theorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra and Verdu's study of the Ālayavijñāna in Dialectical Aspects in Buddhist Thought, Western scholarship treating of the subject is negligible. And while both sources are excellent technical treatises, they fail to integrate in any detailed analysis the dual concepts as complementary modes of each other. Thus, the dissertation, while adopting the methodology of textual analysis, has as its emphasis a thematic-interpretive study of its sources. Conducting a detailed analysis into the structure of the texts, the dissertation delineates and appropriates the inherent ontological, soteriological and epistemological foci which they themselves assume as their natural form.
      Structurally, the dissertation is divided into three major parts. The first focuses on the Tathāgatagarbha, the second on the Ālayavijñāna, the third on their relation and deeper significance in the human thought tradition. The first two parts are sub-divided into seven and four chapters respectively. The former seven chapters establish the ontological identity of the Tathāgata-embryo (Tathagātagarbha) through a critical examination of the major sūtral authority for the concept, i.e., the Śrī-Mālā-Sūtra, and the primary śāstral elaboration inspired by it, viz., the Ratnagotravlbhāga.
      Following the same pattern, the four chapters of part 2 note the role of the Laṅk¯āvatāra Sūtra as a principal scriptural advocate for the theory of the Storehouse Consciousness (Ālayavijñāna), while detailing the scholastic amplification of it in Hsüan Tsang's Ch'eng Wei-Shih Lun. Part 3 concludes the study by recapitulating the principal developments in the emergent complementarity of the two concepts, arguing that any adequate discussion of the Buddha Nature must be informed on the one hand by the theory of the Tathāgatagarbha which grounds and authenticates its ontological status, and on the other by the Ālayavijñāna, its noetic-cognitive determination. While the former tends to elucidate the process towards, and experience of enlightenment as a function of Absolute Suchness (Tathatā), the latter adopts the reciprocal perspective and examines the subject in the light and function of phenomenal consciousness.
      By way of comparison with Western thought, the chapter likewise demonstrates the analogous dynamic in the bilateral theory of the Tathāgatagarbha-Ālayavijñāna and the Hegelian Absolute Spirit in-and-for-itself. Focusing upon The Phenomenology of Spirit, the chapter notes that the self-becoming process in and through which consciousness realizes its own plenitude is strikingly homologous to the theory of Buddhist enlightenment presented through the concept of the Tathāgatagarbha-Ālayavijñāna. It suggests that these two representative thought systems mutually illumine each other, and together illustrate a correspondent framework within which the relationship of the Absolute and relative may gain a more universal conception and therefore, a more comprehensive resolution.

In contrast to, for example, the Christian canon and the Confucian canon, the Buddhist canon is unusually difficult to define, because the Buddhist scriptures are several thousands in nurnber.[1] One who wishes to gain knowledge of this canon cannot be asked or expected to read all or even most of them, so the Buddhist who wishes to present the essence of the teaching to others is immediately faced with the problem of having to pick a representative text to serve as introduction, survey, summary or outline to this vast body of material. This problem is compounded, especially in East Asia, by the existence of many Buddhist schools, most of them having a particular text which served as their bases.[2] For example, the T'ien-t'ai school is based on the Saddharma-paṇḍarīka-sūtra, the Hua-yen school on the Avataṃsaka-sūtra, and so on. Accordingly, to choose a representative text from the several thousand Buddhist scriptures is unavoidably to come very close to accepting some sort of sectarian perspective. Thus, those who enquire after the essence of Buddhist teaching, yet who wish at the outset to avoid sectarian affiliation, will hesitate to approach the canon.
      The problem is compounded even further by the existence of one influential school of Buddhism, the Zen (Ch'an) school, not a few of whose teachers have openly insisted on the harmfulness of reading the scriptures for those intent on achieving Enlightenment. For these teachers and their followers, the scriptures might just as well be burned as read.[3]
      This is not simply a modern problem; it existed in sixth century China.[4] This was the period that saw the appearance of Treatise on the Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna (hereafter referred to as AFM). Once AFM appeared, it very quickly became popular. There seem to be two reasons for this: first, it satisfied the demand of people who wanted one volume that could comprehensively embrace all Buddhist doctrines; second, it is a non-sectarian text.[5] As a matter of fact, AFM was welcomed not only by non-sectarian people but by sectarian people as well. This occasioned another problem: members of some Buddhist sects who welcomed the appearance of AFM tried to use AFM to glorify their own sects. Many of the traditional commentators betrayed such tendencies, the most famous of these being Fa-tsang (643-712 A.D.), the third patriarch of the Hua-yen school in China.[6] One of his characteristic tactics was to anticipate the attack on his sectarian attitude by his opponents, the adherents of the Fa-hsiang school,[7] by using the doctrine of AFM to justify what was specifically the Hua-yen doctrine.
      Fa-tsang's commentaries on AFM exerted a strong influence on his own and succeeding generations, the result being that AFM has sometimes been considered a Hua-yen text.[8] This is certainly unfortunate. But it underscores the hermeneutical problem of how to read a text. Ui Hakuju, one of the most noted of modern Japanese Buddhologists, responded to this problem in his Daijō kishin ron by cautiously suggesting that the text be read apart from its commentaries in order that its real message be grasped.[9] This suggestion is valid only insofar as it screens out those commentaries, such as Fa-tsang's, which already bring a point of view to the text and read the text as confirming that point of view. If, however, the commentary is truly exegetical in nature, then Ui's suggestion is invalid since it cuts off a prospective medium by which one's understanding of the text may be deepened. The commentaries on AFM written by the Korean monk Wǒnhyo (617-686 A.D.) are such a medium.[10]
      Wǒnhyo is regarded as one of the three great commentators on AFM; the other two are Hui-yüan (523-592 A.D.) and Fa-tsang (643-712 A.D.).[11] Wǒnhyo's commentaries are very different from Fa-tsang's: Wǒnhyo is emphatic in characterizing AFM as a text embodying a principle by which all sectarian disputes may be harmonized. According to Wǒnhyo's understanding, if one interprets AFM as a sectarian teaching, one will betray the original intent of its author.[12] Unfortunately, in East Asia, including his home country of Korea, Wǒnhyo's commentaries are simply famous; they are not well-studied.[13] They have generally been neglected in favor of Fa-tsang's.
      Wǒnhyo is, undoubtedly, one of the foremost thinkers that Korea has produced; he wrote much else besides his commentaries on AFM. Yet, although he influenced both Chinese and Japanese thinkers,[14] he is almost unknown in the West. This thesis represents a preliminary attempt at remedying this situation. (Park, preface, 2–5)

Notes

1. A number of books have been written about the Buddhist canon. For the Pali canon see Maurice Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature, Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1933, especially Vol. II, Section III, pp. 1-423. For the Sanskrit texts see Yamada Ryūjō, Bongo Butten no shobunken, Kyoto: Heirakuji shoten, 1977. For the history of the formation of the original Buddhist texts in general, see Maeda Egaku's Genshi Bukkyō seiten no seiritsushi kenkyū, Tokyo: Sankibo Busshorin, 1964. This is the most comprehensive book of its kind.
         The following books on the Chinese Buddhist canon are reliable: Prabodh Chandra Bagchi, Le Canon Bouddhique en Chine; les Traducteurs et les Traductions, Vols. 1 and 4, Paris: Sino-Indica Publications de l'université de Calcutta, 1927-1938; Paul Demiéville, "Sur les Éditions Imprimées du Canon Chinois," Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient, Tome XXIV, Hanoi, 1924; Ono Gemmyō, "Bukkyō kyōten sōron," vol. 12 of Busshō kaisetsu daijiten, Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha, 1931-1936; Kenneth Ch'en, Buddhism in China {Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 365-386.
2. For the schools of Buddhism in China, see Kenneth Ch'en, ibid., pp. 297-364.
3. As Yanagida Seizan, one of the most energetic of contemporary Japanese Zen scholars, says in his discussion of the origin of Ch'an Buddhism in China, the early Ch'an masters such as Bodhidharma (arrived in China in 521 A.D.) and Hui-neng (638-713) did not neglect the importance of canonical instruction. The negligence shown towards the canon was a fairly late development in Ch'an Buddhism, after it had become popular and powerful. Extreme condemnation of scriptural studies began with Kung-an (Koan) Ch'an masters such as Ta-hui (1088-1163). See Yanagida Seizan, Zen shisō (Tokyo: Chuo koronsha, 1975), pp. 9-106 and Yanagida Seizan, Shoki Zenshū shisho no kenkyū (Kyoto: Hozokan, 1967), pp. 419-484.
4. In the second chapter of AFM, "Reasons for Writing the Treatise," there are two pairs of questions and answers; the second one of them is a discussion of this problem. See T. 1666, vol. 32, p. 575c, lines 7-17. Wǒnhyo discusses this in his commentary also: see T. 1844, vol. 44, p. 205c, line 5 - p. 206a, line 16.
5. It is undeniable that AFM became popular very quickly because of the many early records which mention AFM and comrnenbaries on it. However, I disagree with previous scholars such as Mochizuki Shinko and Ui Hakuju about the reasons for its popularity. They claimed that its popularity was due to the fame of Asvaghoa and Paramārtha. This may be true, but it can be only partially true. Many texts bear the names of Aśvaghoṣa and Paramārtha, but none have been as influential as AFM. Therefore, one may say that it was the doctrinal content of AFM which guaranteed its success; only this can explain its prominent historical role in sixth century Chinese Buddhism. Although Wǒnhyo did not doubt the authenticity of the text, he did not discuss the author and translator, whereas Hui-yuan and Fa-tsang did discuss them. See the preface to Mochizuki Shinko's Daijō kishin ron no kenkyū (hereafter referred to as DKK-M) (Tokyo: Kanao bunendo, 1922), pp. 1-5. See also the postface to Ui Hakuju's Daijō kishin ron (hereafter referred to as DK-U) (Tokyo: Iwanami bunko, 1936), pp. 131-132. See also T. 1843 vol. 44, p. 175c, line 11 - p. 176a, line 8 and T. 1846, vol. 44, p. 245c, line 25 - p. 246a, line 8.
6. For the nature of Fa-tsang's commentaries, see DK-U, p. 132. An excellent overall survey of commentaries on AFM is given in Mochizuki Shinko's DKK-M, pp. 203-346. Mochizuki's survey includes detailed and annotated explanations of 176 commentaries on AFM. For the most recent comprehensive survey see Hirakawa Akira's Daijō kishin ron (Tokyo: Daizō shuppan kabushiki kaisha, 1976), pp. 390-413.
7. Murakami Senshō gives a good review of the criticism of AFM. See his Daijō kishin ron kōgi (Tokyo: Tōyō daigaku shuppanbu, 1912), pp. 19-31.
8. See DK-U, pp. 138-139.
9. See ibid., p. 140.
10. Wǒnhyo wrote nine commentaries on AFM; only two are extant: T. 1844 and T. 1845 (see Part Two, "Introduction to Translation"). For the titles of the seven missing commentaries see the third section of Part One, "Wǒnhyo's Bibliography."
11. Almost all the books and records about AFM mention the three great commentaries. The earliest attested one to do so is the preface by the Japanese monk Kakugen. It is included in T. 1844, vol. 44, p. 202a, lines 3-4. See my translation of Kakugen's preface in the Appendix.
12. T. 1845, vol. 44, p. 226b, line 12.
13. Many books and papers have been published about Wǒnhyo, but few of them are critical. There have been three translations of Wǒnhyo's commentaries into modern Korean, but none of the three is reliable. See Note 3 to the translation in Part Two.
14. See Motoi Nobuo's paper, "Shiragi Gangyo no denki ni tsuite," Ōtani gakuhō XLI, No. 1 (1961), p. 37.

Abstract

This dissertation argues that the Yogâcāra Buddhism transmitted by the Indian translator Paramârtha (Ch. Zhendi 真諦) underwent a significant transformation due to the influence of his later Chinese interpreters, a phenomenon to which previous scholars failed to paid enough attention.
      I begin with showing two contrary interpretations of Paramârtha's notion of jiexing 解性. The traditional interpretation glosses jiexing in terms of "original awakening" (benjue 本覺) in the Awakening of Faith and hence betrays its strong tie to that text. In contrast, a contrary interpretation of jiexing is preserved in a Dunhuang fragment Taishō No. 2805 (henceforth abbreviated as T2805).
      The crucial part of this dissertation consists in demonstrating that T2805 and the Awakening of Faith represent two competing lineages of the interpreters of Paramârtha. The first clue is that modern scholars have voiced objection to the traditional attribution of the Awakening of Faith to Paramârtha. In addition, I discovered that striking similarities exist between T2805 and Paramârtha's corpus with respect to terminology, style of phrasing, and doctrine. I further draw attention to the historical testimonies about two different doctrinal views held by Paramârtha's interpreters. Therefore, I argue that there were two lineages in the name of Paramârtha's disciples around 590 CE: the indirect lineage interpreted Paramârtha through the lens of the Awakening of Faith; and the direct lineage—represented by T2805—preserved Paramârtha's original teachings but died out prematurely. Later Chinese Buddhist tradition mistakenly regards the indirect lineage as Paramârtha's true heir and attributes the Awakening of Faith to Paramârtha.
      This implies that Paramârtha may have agreed with Xuanzang 2T5c (600–664) much more than scholars used to assume. For example, Xuanzang's characterization of the notion of "aboriginal uncontaminated seeds" looks very similar to how Paramârtha depicts jiexing. It also implies that we should distinguish the strong sense of the notion of "tathāgatagarbha" in the Awakening of Faith from its weak sense. The fact that even Vasubandhu endorses the weak sense of "tathāgatagarbha" strongly challenges the received wisdom that Yogâcāra and Tathāgatagarbha were two distinct and antagonistic trends of thought in India.

China, the country traditionally ruled by the Confucian literati, has prided herself in being moderate, rational and agnostic. So prevalent is this self-image, projected by her cultural elite and enhanced by Sinology itself, that to many, China is still the paradigm of la vie de la moderation, or, in Chinese, of chung-yung (the mean).
      However, historically, China did mysteriously seem to lose her sense of proportion in what may be regarded as her "medieval", or, better, Buddhist period, roughly from the fourth to the tenth centuries A.D. At that time, China showed she was capable of all the extravagance of the spirit that one, for better or for worse, still associates with the word "religious."
      By the twelveth or thirteenth century, during the Sung period (960-1279 A.D.), China regained her sense of proportion and came down to earth once more. The Sung Neo-Confucian triumph was not simply due to the institutional strength of the literati alone, as has been so often argued. The same literati only a short while earlier embraced wholeheartedly the Buddhist mysteries. The Neo-Confucian triumph was due to new spiritual insights into the nature and destiny of man and the priorities of life. It is the Neo-Confucian polemics against the Buddhist that still cloud modern Chinese views of the Buddhist tradition. The anticlerical attitude of modern Western humanism introduced into China during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries does not help much to correct these long-cherished Neo-Confucian opinions. Even the more objective Sinologist still follow Dr. Hu Shih's interpretation that Buddhism was ultimately an alien plague or anomaly that led China astray from her "predestined" humanism.¹
      In many studies on Chinese Buddhism, the emphasis has been put on the so-called "Sinicization" process and on the confrontation between Chinese and Indian "essences." For example, emphasis has been placed on how "otherworldly" Indian Buddhism was transformed by the Chinese "essence" of "worldliness." The assumption that cultures may be described in terms of "essences" oversimplifies the complex human issues. Additionally, too strong a focus on the dynamics of "acculturation" can misconstrue the religious elements involved. I would prefer to look at the issue from a slightly different perspective. The question I raise is not how China was "Indianized'", as Hu Shih would put it, but how the Chinese were converted to the Buddhist Dharma (Law) and came to recognize the truth in it.¹ Nor is it a question of how an Indian religion was "Sinicized" but how the Buddhist sangha (fellowship) in China underwent self-transformation, drawing upon inspirations from within the Buddhist tradition itself. For example, the turn towards the world or the rejection of otherworldliness or, better, "othershoreliness" was already in the Mahayana tradition itself as in the dictum "Samsara is nirvana, nirvana is samsara." The Buddhist tradition is never simply "otherworldly mystical" but contains within itself a wealth of teachings providing a whole range of orientations towards the world. As the Buddhist sangha matured in China, the Chinese Buddhists merely developed those elements in the Mahayana tradition closest to her "native" heart.
      The phenomenon of "Sinitic Mahayana" should therefore be objectively analyzed as a cultural phenomenon and also sympathetically appreciated in its own religious terms. Just as Christianity is considered to be a creative synthesis of the Classical and the Hebraic tradition, Sinitic Mahayana should also be seen as a proud and independent offspring of the Indian and Chinese confluence. The Hebraic concept of the Messiah and the Greek idea of the Logos merged into the Christian notion of Christ as the Word of God. Similarly, it can be shown that the mature Chinese Buddhist concept of li (principle) as it was used by the Hua-yen school, was a union of the Buddhist Dharma and the Chinese Tao. Li synthesized the original meanings of Dharma and Tao, both symbols for "Transcendence", and articulated their structural interrelationship in a manner unknown before in India or China. The Sinitic understanding of the Mahayana Dharma is comparable to the Christian Church's proclamation (kerygma) concerning God—it is a new insight into an eternal truth.
      The approach outlined above· would seem to be the natural and proper approach in the understanding of Chinese Buddhism. However, for some reasons, scholars have not yet followed such paths of investigation. I hope the thesis' attempt to combine the traditional sectarian Buddhological approach (which sees all Chinese Buddhist innovations to be solidly grounded in sacred Indian scriptures) and the modern critical historical analysis can reveal more faithfully the dynamics of the Buddhist faith in Chinese history.¹      The larger issues mentioned in the preface here form the backdrop for the more specific study of one Chinese Buddhist text in the body of the thesis. I am interested in the "emergence of Sinitic Mahayana" ca. 600 A.D. in China and in the role the Awakening of Faith in Mahayana (Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun) played in bringing it about.¹ (Lai, preface, i–v)

Notes

(As numbered in the original manuscript)
1. Hu Shih, "The Indianization of China: A Case Study in Cultural Borrowings," Independence, Convergence and Borrowing in Institutions, Thought and Art (Cambridge: . Harvard Tercentenary Publication, 1937). Kenneth Ch'en, in his book The Chinese Transformation of Buddhism (Princeton: 1973) follows explicitly Hu Shih's approach.
1 See Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (New York: 1972). The Dharma is "Truth" and it is no more Indian than the Christian God is Jewish.
1. For a review of the limitations of sectarian scholarship, see Kamata Shigeo's critical resume (in English) in his Chūgoku Bukkyō shisō shi kenkyū (Tokyo: 1969).

Abstract

This thesis is a study of the heart of Prajñākaramati's Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā: the only commentary preserved in Sanskrit on Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra, one of the most popular and influential texts in Mahāyāna Buddhism. The primary purpose of the thesis is an annotated translation of the Prajñāpāramitā Pariccheda (Wisdom Chapter) of the Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā. The translation is based on Louis de La Vallée Poussin's edition of the Sanskrit text with close reference to the Tibetan a translation. The annotations present material necessary to understand Prajñākaramati's commentary both regarding the terminology he uses and the context in which he was writing. The annotations identify sources of quotations and parallel passages in other texts, and provide references to scholarly material on the subject matter treated by Prajñākaramati. While the reference point for the translation has been the Sanskrit text the Tibetan translation has been studied as an aid to the translation. Note has been made of where the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts diverge and some variant readings have been offered on this basis. There is an appendix containing an edited version of the Derge (sDe dge) and Peking editions of the Tibetan translation. A short introduction outlines the scope of the work, presents the known facts concerning Śāntideva and Prajñākaramati and their works, and discusses scholarly research done on Prajñākaramati's commentary. (Source: Australian National University)

Abstract

This study is an examination of Master Yinshun's hermeneutics. It focuses especially on his interpretation of the Buddhist concept known as the tathagatagarbha, which refers to the idea that all sentient beings intrinsically possess the "womb of the Buddha." In some explanations of this teaching, the tathāgatagarbha is symbolic of the practitioner's potential for attaining enlightenment. In others, it functions as a synonym for the Ultimate and becomes the eternalistic substrate for all of existence. It is this latter view to which Yinshun takes exception, seeing it as antithetical to the doctrine of emptiness which espouses the notion that all things, including ideas, material objects, and living beings, lack a permanent and independent nature and thus cannot possess an unchanging, eternalistic form.
      I focus particularly on Yinshun's text A Study of the Tathāgatagarbha, for it serves as a concise statement of his interpretation of the tathāgatagarbha and its relationship to emptiness. In this text, Yinshun continually asserts the doctrine of emptiness as the definitive expression of Buddhist truth and relegates the tathāgatagarbha to the category of expedient means. He does this by examining the development of the tathāgatagarbha emphasizing particularly its evolution within pre-Mahāyāna and Mahāyāna textual sources said to have had their genesis in India such as the Āgamas, the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and the Ratnagotravibhāga. For Yinshun, to regard the tathāgatagarbha as the ultimate truth rather than as an expedient means can only result in misguided practice and confusion about how to attain enlightenment.
      I conclude by asking a number of general questions about Yinshun's thought and its relationship to the early to mid-twentieth century intellectual milieu in China. I also inquire about how Yinshun's ideas have contributed to the development of contemporary Chinese Buddhist movements flourishing in Taiwan today. (Source: Worldcat Library Materials Online)