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Abstract

This dissertation critically examines and demonstrates how Jingyuan (1011-1088), a Song Dynasty Chinese Buddhist monk, transformed the Avataṁsaka Sūtra into a liturgy that conveyed the Sūtra's vision of the Mahāyāna Bodhisattva ideal. In keeping with the earlier interpreters, Chengguan (738-839) and Zongmi (780-841), Jingyuan understood the Avataṁsaka Sūtra, long considered the pinnacle of Buddhist philosophy and cosmology, as a handbook of Bodhisattva practices. For them the Bhadracarīpranidhāna Chapter, the source of the Avataṁsaka Liturgy, held the key to cultivating the Bodhisattva Path articulated by the Sūtra. Jingyuan distilled the essential elements of Samantabhadra Bodhisattva's Practices and Vows that comprise the Bhadracarīpranidhāna into existing liturgical formats. The result was three recensions, collectively referred to as the Avataṁsaka Liturgy - - the Expanded, the Condensed, and the Popular Versions - - in varying degrees of complexity, suited to the different needs of his Buddhist community.

To transform Mahāyāna ideals into liturgy, Jingyuan drew upon visualizations from the Bhadracarīpranidhāna, which when performed with ritual prostrations, constituted the heart of the liturgical practice. He further integrated two distinctly Avataṁsaka visualizations: the Infinite Contemplation of Indra's Net and the Unobstructed Contemplation of the Dharma Realm, into the sitting meditation section of his Expanded Liturgy. Thus, Jingyuan combined the movement of bowing with the stillness of meditation to produce a single method for cultivating the samādhi states articulated by the Avataṁsaka Sūtra. Jingyuan's efforts revitalized the Avataṁsaka tradition in twelfth century Hangzhou and earned him recognition as an Avataṁsaka patriarch.

The dissertation concludes with reflections on the continuity of the Avataṁsaka Liturgy among contemporary Buddhists and suggests that contemplative-devotional liturgies can be a useful, even necessary aspect of Buddhist practice as it emerges in the West. The appendices include translations of the three recensions of the Avataṁsaka Liturgy, the Bhadracarī Chapter of the Avataṁsaka Sūtra, and the Sūtra on the Contemplation of the Practice Dharmas of Samantabhadra Bodhisattva.

Abstract

This work is made up of three unequal parts. The first part contains an edition of the Sanskrit text of what I have called 'Redaction A' of the Bhaiṣajyaguru-Sūtra. This edition is based on a single manuscript found at Gilgit; with variants from four other manuscripts, also found at Gilgit, given in the critical apparatus. Stylistically 'Redaction A' seems to represent an 'unrevised" version of the text, perhaps a first attempt at Gilgit to commit an oral tradition to writing. The second part consists of a critical edition of the Tibetan translation of a Sanskrit text of the Bhaiṣajyaguru-Sūtra. This edition is based on the Derge, Narthan, Peking and Lhasa versions of the 'phags pa bcom ldan 'das sman gyi bla bai ạu rya'i 'od kyi snon gyi smon lam gyi khyad par rgyas pa and the 'phags pa de bźin gśegs pa bdun gyi snon gyi smon lam gyi khyad par rgyas pa. The Derge versions form the basis of the edition. The first and second parts are preliminary studies to the third and main part, since the whole was not intended as a study of the Bhaiṣajyaguru-Sūtra per se. This third part is devoted to an English translation of the Sanskrit text, with notes; the latter making up the bulk of the work. In these notes I have attempted to show how a literate member of the Gilgit community, assuming he was familiar with the texts known to have been available to him, would have, or could have, understood the Bhaiṣajyaguru-Sūtra, I have also attempted to show what was and what was not unique to the Bhaiṣajyaguru-Sūtra vis-a-vis the Gilgit collection as a whole, and to make the first tentative steps towards reconstructing the 'Buddhism' current at Gilgit in the 5th-6th century.

Abstract

This thesis contends that Thomas Merton's agape (1915 –1968) and Shantideva's karuna (8th century C.E.) have a strong affinity through the moral dimensions of what are referred to as unconditional kindness, positive ethics, and deep empathy. It is seeking to contribute a new perspective to the study of religious ethics by comparing the moral thought of two influential personages in a hermeneutic exercise. It aims to demonstrate that Shantideva's philosophy on Buddhist karuna enters a realm of common moral rapport with Merton's treatment of Christian agape.
       Agape is the Christian concept and practice of love that is unconditional and voluntary; drawing its life from the triune God’s divine nature. Karuna, or compassion, is the Buddhist motivation that forms the foundation of the enlightened mind for all beings (bodhichitta). The precise element of Merton and Shantideva's dialogue consists of their moral dimensions, rubrics of ethical practice and experience identified in the converging perspectives of agape and karuna. Unconditional kindness is the dimension of devotion to others through the windows of non-attachment and unqualified care. Positive ethics is the rubric that aims for an open vision of moral practice that respects the complexities of individuals' psychological and social situations. Finally, deep empathy is the dimension of understanding the Other, formed through Merton's theology of love and empathy and Shantideva's teachings on the mind and the exchange of self and other. These dimensions form the basis of dialogue between Merton's agape and Shantideva's karuna.
      This exchange is first established by examining the strands of ethical similarity in Shantideva's karuna and Merton's agape. It is then developed through the exploration of the common moral dimensions of unconditional kindness, positive ethics and deep empathy. The methodology builds on Gadamer's hermeneutic of a fusion of horizons to achieve a fusion of three horizons in the encounter with karuna and agape. This fusion consists of the horizons of Merton and Shantideva as well as the author's.
      One of the wider implications of this study is that the practice of Merton's Christian agape complements the practice of Shantideva's Buddhist karuna, and vice versa. It will explore the general harmony of these central religious concepts and their wider application into the moral dimensions, leading to new directions of the scholarship of ethics in Buddhist-Christian studies. Fundamentally, this thesis hopes to bridge the gap between two monumental monastic writers by constructing an ethical reading around a hitherto undiscovered connection. It will create a relationship of affinity between two spheres of moral spirituality from two celebrated writers far apart in time, but quite close in their understanding of the ethics of love and compassion.

Abstract

In the Śikṣāsamuccaya Śāntideva, a Mādhyamika philosopher of the early eighth century A.D., builds upon the philosophy of śūnyatā (emptiness) to demonstrate its practical implications in religious life. In his portrayal of the Bodhisattva Śāntideva focuses on this religious hero's ascent from imperfection toward the realisation of prajñāpāramitā, the perfection of wisdom. Wisdom, philosophically the end of all false ideas about reality, in the sphere of behaviour is an ethical ideal characterised by compassion and altruism. The Bodhisattva is one who has mastered wisdom and whose conduct is permeated with this ethical ideal. Śāntideva's presentation of the Bodhisattva is not limited to the ideal, but also explores the many levels of achievement through which an aspiring novice-Bodhisattva must progress toward fulfilment of the ideal. Though Śāntideva refers to certain levels in a Bodhisattva's development and to certain turning points in his career these factors as presented in the Śikṣā do not explain how Śāntideva understands the novice-Bodhisattva in terms of the ideal. The concept of bodhicitta, the thought of enlightenment which all Bodhisattvas possess, parallels in its development with the Bodhisattva's development, and as a possible equivalent to wisdom itself serves to link the imperfect to the ideal. Śāntideva's use of comparison between the imperfect and the ideal suggests that his presentation of the Bodhisattva is designed to encourage novice-Bodhisattvas to strive for perfection. The themes of teaching, example, and purpose indicate that Śāntideva's understanding of the Bodhisattva and wisdom involves the idea of the Bodhisattva's function, as the link through which the ideal of moral perfection and wisdom has effect in the imperfect world.

Abstract

This thesis compares the ethical theories of two 8th century Indian philosophers, Śāntideva and Śaṅkara. In order to construct their ethics from philosophical premises, a metaphysical approach has been taken. A comparison of these two philosophers has never been made, nor has there been any major comparative study of the ethics of their two traditions, Indian Madhyamaka Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta. In opening the way for further comparisons between these two schools, I wish to question the manner in which scholars have consistently divided them along self/non-self (ātman/anātman) lines. The key to the comparison is thus the notion of individuated self (jīva) rather than the less personal ātman.
      Once the full implications of Advaita metaphysics are understood, whereby all consciousness is ultimately that of the one brahman, then, at the individuated level of consciousness, the ethical situation is strangely similar to the Buddhist with their notion of non-self (anātman). We thus have two rival schools positing a radical notion of the individual as having no unified centre of moral agency. Both schools adopt a methodology of Two Truths, the relative and the ultimate, in order to allow for both a provisional ethical framework and the potential for world transcendence.
      It was decided that the most convenient form of ethical comparison was a qualified form of altruism, here called “constructive altruism”. This is a form of other-regarding ethics which allows for the concept of a non-giver, i.e. a person who has realised selflessness and has seen through the "illusion" of individuation. This person then takes it upon himself to construct the other so as to gain a focus for the compassionate activity of teaching. The aim of such teaching is the liberation (mokṣa) of freedom-seeking disciples from this cyclic existence (saṃsāra) and its prevalent potential for suffering (duḥkha).

Abstract

This is a study of compassion in the non-tantric literature of Indian Buddhism focused on whether it is correctly characterized as self-abnegating altruism. Because the meanings of concepts like karuṇā, anukampā, and maitrī overlap and dominant terms tend to subsume the meanings of others, this study works with a broad sense of compassion as empathetic sensitivity. It brings to light the strong presence of themes of interpretation that emphasize the circular complementarity of benefiting oneself and benefiting others. This pattern holds even in apparent examples of extreme self-sacrifice and places doubt on assessments of Indian Buddhist ethics as self-abnegating.
      The methodology here is based on an argument that Buddhist sūtras are tapestries woven of threads drawn from a common stock of intertextual motifs and themes. It identifies key intertextual themes and then evaluates the range of their interpretive treatment from various philosophical perspectives.
      The first chapter explores the general meaning, including the relation of passion to compassion, meditative techniques, powers and benefits, and the theme of svaparārtha. The second focuses on compassion as the motivation for the path. It shows strong continuities between mainstream and Mahāyāna Buddhism, in the double-edged aspirations of arhats and bodhisattvas to pursue personal development for the sake of others. It definitively documents that the bodhisattva vow can not be read as a renunciation of enlightenment. The third analyzes compassion and the realization of emptiness as a moment on the path, focusing on sources that direct the bodhisattva to skillfully postpone nirvāṇa by avoiding the realization of emptiness. Apparently advocating renunciation of enlightenment, they actually guide the practitioner to buddhahood through avoidance of arhat's nirvāṇa. The fourth examines the relationship of compassion to selflessness and emptiness, tracing the discussion of the ontological ālambana of karuṇā with a special focus on Prajñākaramati's commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva. It concludes that even the highest compassion is based on conventional truth, but that this is a conventional wisdom informed by the realization of emptiness.

Abstract

Altruistic and greater-good considerations are not only fundamental aspects of ethical maturity, but also a basic means for coming to know each other. Rational egoism (the view that practical rationality requires some form of personal pay-off for the goal-driven agent) is not so easily snubbed, nor has it fallen terribly out of fashion in the social sciences and economics. I argue that it is not a truism that altruism is less natural than egocentrism for an ordinary self. It is false. I aim to reconceive the problem that altruistic considerations seem less rational than justified, egocentric considerations. I conclude that the self can identify with subjectivity as such, and thereby advance the interests of a "we-self." While epistemically distant, the "we-self" is ontologically prior to the ego.
      I conceive the problem in terms of a central distinction in Indian philosophy; the distinction between an ego-self (ahaṅkāra) and either a bundle of property tropes (as we find in schools of Buddhist philosophy), or a persisting synthesizer of experiences that is not solely identified as "this body" (as we find in Monistic-Śaivism). For Mādhyamika-Buddhist thinkers like Śāntideva (c. 8th century C.E.), an error-theory of self provides good reasons for altruism. I argue that this is logically unconvincing. In chapter 3, I appropriate Levinas’s discussion of the Other/other to develop a Buddhist-inspired, Emptiness Ethics. However, I dismantle this in chapter 4, where I appeal to aspectual metaphysics, particularly, the notion of composition as identity (CAI), to clarify not only the rational status of other-centric considerations, but the very possibility of acting on such considerations.
      In chapter 4, I offer a Śaivist-inspired solution to the problem of other minds. Borrowing from Abhinavagupta (c. 10th-11th century C.E.), I contend that the possibility of identifying with and acting for a larger whole lies in recognizing ourselves as both individuals and others (bhedābheda). I develop this by showing how normativity and a concept of selfhood go hand in hand; and, furthermore, the reflexivity of consciousness allows us to recognize a self that is not limited to only practical and narrative identities, but to self as such.

Abstract

For the past few decades, Buddhism has become a trending academic topic in Western departments, in religious studies as well as philosophy. This thesis is concerned with the way in which the domain of Buddhist ethics has been discussed and is developing, particularly in the field of comparative studies. Since one of the core doctrines of Buddhism is no-self, the "anātman", Western scholars have shied away from making positive claims over the nature of moral agency and ethical reasoning in Buddhism. The purpose of this thesis is to analyse and discuss the extent to which we can understand, contextualise and explain Buddhist ethics from the lens of Western philosophical concepts and traditions. Specifically, this thesis parallels Kant's system with Buddhism. This thesis is going to be broadly addressing some thematic aspects in the Buddhist philosophy of Śāntideva and the Mādhyamaka tradition he belongs to, as well as how Buddhist ethics he developed have emerged from the Mādhyamaka theoretical framework. The first chapter will look at the tools of reasoning Mādhyamikas use to justify their metaphysical claims of an ontological dualism, illustrated by the doctrine of conventional and ultimate truths, respectively.[1] Some of the main arguments that defend the conventional-ultimate distinction shall be placed in a dialogue with Kantian metaphysics.
      The basic questions addressed in my thesis are as follows: Is there really a need to create a barrier between what we consider to be the traditional Western philosophical canon, starting with the ancient Greeks to the contemporary Anglo-European tradition, in contrast to a supposedly independent "Asian tradition"? In the methodological section, I shall discuss the extent to which such categories of philosophical traditions are helpful, for not only understanding the way philosophical concepts are used in their respective tradition, but also how this contextualization of ideas and their application in ethics, can lead to a comparative study. By this I mean that as the status quo, we often use certain conventional linguistic designations in order to attribute them to the philosophical ideas they represent. For example, the school of rationalism includes thinkers such as Leibniz, Spinoza and Descartes. In that way, if I were to make a claim that a Buddhist thinker is a rationalist, I would engage with the convention of what rationalism means in the contemporary discourse of philosophy. However, if I would also make the claim that a Buddhist thinker is a rationalist, it would question the extent to which not only the word "rationalism" has been used thus far in the history of philosophy, but it would also open up the discussion of redefining the word "rationalism", in relation to potentially other ideas and philosophies that would have similar types of argumentation and analysis that have been yet to be labelled, or included, under the conventional framework of the previously existing word in the history of philosophy. Given this plastic and contingent relationship between words and meaning, I propose that it is not the content of the definition itself that would change, but perhaps, as Wittgenstein discusses meaning in relation to definitions, some words tend to have similar meanings. This linguistic phenomenon is described by Wittgenstein as a family resemblance.[2][3] Similarly to how the word "rationality" can have a plurality of uses even within philosophical schools, so can we put those systems of linguistic designation in contrast to the Mādhyamaka technique of using reason.[4] This ought to result in a broader context of how we understand rationality, not only for the purpose of comparative philosophy, but a more so for a holistic perspective and academic paradigm that would contribute to the history of philosophy.
      Some of the framework discussions will include Śāntideva's affiliation with the Mādhyamaka school of Buddhism, as well as with Kant's unique reconciliation of empiricism and rationalism, in relation to the foundation of his ethical view of deontology. In order to lay some of the groundwork for this comparative study, I'll begin by addressing some of the intricacies in the notion of conventionality, and how both Kant's views as well as the Mādhyamaka philosophy explain conventional truth. One of the most comprehensive works that we currently have in the academia regarding the subject of Śāntideva's ethical philosophy, specifically in comparison to Western ethical traditions, is the work of Charles Goodman.[5] Therefore, a significant part of this thesis will review Goodman's books on Śāntideva, and provide a commentary to Goodman's interpretation of how Śāntideva should be integrated and read in the Western tradition. Goodman's main argument is that Śāntideva should be read as what he calls an act-consequentialist.[6] Since the philosopher I'm comparing Śāntideva with is Kant, I'll examine the extent to which Goodman is correct in asserting Śāntideva's position in the Western canon, as well as provide an interpretive paradigm for understanding Śāntideva as a deontologist.

Notes

1. Vose, Kevin "Resurrecting Candrakīrti, Disputes in the Tibetan Creation of Prāsangika", Wisdom Publications 2009 p. 66-7.
2. Wittgenstein, Ludwig "Philosophical Investigations", German text with English translation by G.E.M Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, Revised 4th edition by P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, Blackwell Publishing 2009, page 36e, PI 67.
3. Forthcoming: Kuusela, Oskari "Wittgenstein and the unity of good" p's. 6-7.
4. Vose Ibid p. 99.
5. Goodman, Charles "Consequences of Compassion" An Interpretation & Defence of Buddhist Ethics, Oxford University Press, 2009.
6. Goodman, Ibid p. 29.

Abstract

In the following thesis I outline Schopenhauer’s ethics in its metaphysical context and in contrast to ethics based on egoism. I look at criticisms of Schopenhauer’s philosophy which have emerged quite recently, and some of which (if valid) would undermine Schopenhauer’s compassion-based moral theory. I have explained these criticisms and offered a defence of Schopenhauer. In order to take up Schopenhauer’s claim of affinity with Buddhist philosophy, I outline first of all early Buddhist then Mahāyāna ethics focusing on the latter’s central idea of compassion.
      It has been suggested by some scholars that there are specific problems in Buddhist ethics which undermine the idea of compassion and I explain, then attempt to counter, these claims with specific reference to Śāntideva and his rejection of egoism as a means of acting in a moral way or of finding liberation from suffering. I then address recent criticisms of Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra, especially the idea that the specific role of compassion in his ethics and its soteriological role are illogical – an idea which I argue against.
      Finally I compare the core ideas of Schopenhauer’s solution to the problem of suffering with what seems similar in Śāntideva. In doing this, I examine whether or not Schopenhauer is right in claiming convergence between Buddhism and his own philosophy, especially in the area of soteriology as it relates to ethics.

Abstract

This dissertation conducts a comparative study of the cultivation of the virtues in Catholic spiritual tradition and the perfections (pāramitās) in the Mahāyāna Buddhist traditions in view of the spiritual needs of contemporary Croatian young adults. The comparison is carried out through the exploration of two key texts: The Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola, a sixteenth-century Basque Catholic, and the founder of the Society of Jesus, and The Way of the Bodhisattva (Bodhicaryāvatāra) of Śāntideva, an eight-century Indian Mahāyāna monk.
      The study links the central teachings of the Catholic faith to the daily life and identity of young Catholics through the cultivation of the virtues/ pāramitās, re-imagined for the modem sensibilities of today's Croatia. Such practice understands the cultivation of the virtues/pāramitās as intentional, deliberate, and cognitive behavioral activity through which one shapes one's life according to a particular vision of ultimate reality.
      The primary objective of this study is to fill a vital need within the Catholic community in the small but culturally and religiously complex nation of Croatia. The general problem facing Croat Catholics today is the clash of Catholic pre-modernity with modem and post-modern ideas and institutions. In this encounter, pre-modern Catholic religious forms no longer satisfy the needs and expectations of modem young adults in a society increasingly marked by cultural and religious pluralism.
      The immediate context of my study is the "3D Formation Program," a three-yearlong systematic program for young adults organized by the University Students Catholic Academic Center (SK.AC), which belongs to the Jesuit university chaplaincy at Zagreb University. The name "3D" is an abbreviation of the Croatian words, Duh, Dusa, and Drustvo, meaning "Spirit, Soul and Society." My study argues that a fruitful synthesis between Ignatius and Śāntideva with regard to the cultivation of virtues/pārarmitās may contribute to a form of Catholic spirituality that is intellectually and behaviorally challenging, relevant, and compelling for today's Croatian young adults.
      Buddhism is attractive for Catholics because of its practicality, immediately pragmatic effects, monastic institutions, and ritual richness. It therefore serves as a good dialogue partner for lgnatian spirituality in the cultivation of a contextualized spiritual practice. Though the two traditions differ radically on the level of doctrinal assumptions and consequently, ultimate goals, they share a great deal on the level of the practice of virtues/pāramitās, which assumes a common, human, biological-intellectual substratum.
      The theoretical framework of this study is the comparative theological method developed by Francis Clooney, complemented with Judith Berling's interreligious learning. The reason for merging Clooney's and Berling's methods lies in the nature of my work, which involves studying each text in its own context (Clooney) as well as considering contemporary interpretations within " living" communities (Berling). The work is interdisciplinary in nature. In addition to comparative theology and interreligious learning, the study applies an historical and sociological framework to an analysis of the political, economic, ideological, religious, and cultural dimensions of the Croatian context. This analysis forms the foundation of a contextualized spiritual practice for young adults who are seeking genuine encounter with God in the complex historical reality of Croatia.

Abstract

Through comparing Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae with Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra, this study makes use of the distinction between "human love" and "divine love" as a conceptual framework to study about love in Christian and Buddhist traditions.

In Chapter 1, I defined the meaning of divine love and human love, dividing the latter into human love1 and human love2. The former emphasizes aspects such as desire, sentiments, and personal benefit, while the latter emphasizes aspects such as benevolence and altruism. Chapter 2 introduced the reader to the terminologies of love seen in the Summa Theologiae and the Bodhicaryāvatāra in order to highlight the different types of love found in Christianity and Mahayana Buddhism. In Chapter 3, I discussed Aquinas's fourfold categorization of love: amor, dilectio, caritas, and misericordia. And I advance an interpretation of the relationship between these different kinds of love. Chapter 4 is about Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra, its Mahayanist compassion, and altruistic spirit. I also discuss Śāntideva's view of worldly love; he emphatically promotes that practitioners abandon worldly love in order to embrace the Bodhisattva ideal of compassion. By comparing Aquinas and Śāntideva’s accounts of love, chapter 5 illustrates how Buddhism illuminates Christianity regarding the relation between divine love and human love, and, how Christianity illuminates Buddhism regarding the relation between self-love and altruism. I conclude this dissertation by drawing out some major differences regarding the relationship between divine love and human love in Christian and Buddhist traditions and the implications for interpreting their religious goals and experience.

This study carries an in-depth study of love in a wider context of Christian and Buddhist traditions. Based on the methodology of “reciprocal illumination” and dialoguing with the interdisciplinary studies on love, its findings contribute to the Christian-Buddhist studies/comparison in particular and the comparative philosophy of religions in general.

Abstract

This thesis is a contribution to the study of the interpretation of the concept of bodhicitta. This concept is a technical term of frequent occurrence in Buddhist Sanskrit literature. Within the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition, bodhicitta is closely related to the spiritual practices of the Buddhist aspirant to enlightenment. Specifically researched is Śāntideva’s use of this concept in his Bodhicaryāvatāra, a text known to have been composed around the 8th century. The form of this study is as follows: first, a survey of the various interpretations of the concept of bodhicitta suggested so far; secondly, an analysis of its possible functions in the context of the spiritual path of the aspirant to enlightenment; thirdly, a discussion of what I believe to be an appropriate understanding of bodhicitta. An argument will be made that the path to realization consists in cultivating an awareness of the reality described by the concept of bodhicitta. Such cultivation should bring one to the realization that what is described by it is indeed the only possible reality. This means that bodhicitta is the means to as well as the description of the goal to attain.

Abstract

Buddhism, as a religion arose in ancient India and developed in various parts of the world, aims at the unique goal that is providing welfare and happiness for human beings. The real happiness brought to mankind by Buddhism is not a satisfaction of self-requirement, but a spiritual benefit coming from enlightenment of the absolute truth, emancipation of the ego of things and persons, and free from the hindrances of passion and ignorance. Buddhism that is mainly based on teachings of the Buddha delivered at different places on different occasions continues to develop and adapt to the new challenges in the form of thought, different cultures, religions, customs and tradition of the people wherever it went. However, all the Buddha’s teachings originate in the enlightenment of the Buddha.
      All traditions of Buddhism accept that the Buddha attained enlightenment through stages of meditation that led to the Buddhahood endowed with transcendent wisdom and compassion. According to some Mahāyāna scriptures, the Buddhahood is nothing other than the Buddhanature which is the inherent essence within all beings. The doctrine of the Buddha-nature presented in several Mahāyāna scriptures of the so-called Tathāgatagarbha literature was formed in about the third century CE. There is no evidence that the doctrine of Buddha-nature formed a school in India like the Śūnyatā (Emptiness) of the Mādhyamika or the Vijñaptimātratā (Consciousness-only) of the Yogācāra School, but the Buddha-nature plays an important role in the religious life of Mahāyāna Buddhism in the East and Southeast Asian countries because it provides a faith of the permanence and immortality due to a declaration that all sentient beings possess the innate Buddha-nature and have a potentiality of becoming the Buddhas.
      Although most of the followers of Mahāyāna Buddhism believe the doctrine of the Buddha-nature and constantly try their best endeavor to attain the goal of Buddhahood, there were a lot of opinions that criticize the doctrine of the Buddha-nature by asserting that it is not Buddhist because this idea of the Buddha-nature seems to be akin to the permanent Self (ātman/brahman) presented in the Vedānta of Brahmanism. Conversely, according to some other scholars, the Buddha nature or Tathāgatagarbha referred in some Mahāyāna Sūtras does not represent a substantial self or ego; it is rather a positive language to express the thought of śūnyatā and to represent the potentiality of realizing the Buddhahood through Buddhist practices. Modern scholars today fall into an unending discussion about the similarity or difference between the Buddha-nature and Brahman but no one compares the date of these doctrines. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is an attempt to clarify the Buddhist orthodoxy of the doctrine of the Buddha-nature through chronological comparison of the date of Buddha-nature with that of Brahman. Based on the Laṅkāvatārasūtra and other scriptures, the work attempt to elucidate that the Buddhist thought of the Buddha-nature had existed prior the Vedāntic thought of Brahman. Indeed, the thesis shows that while the doctrine of the Buddha-nature had come into existence in the third century CE in the Tathāgatagarbha literature, the Vedāntic doctrine of Brahman appeared for the first time in the sixth century CE. Consequently, although the Buddha-nature is closely akin to Brahman/ātman of the Vedānta, the doctrine of the Buddha-nature is originally a thought of Buddhism. For this reason, the writer chose the topic entitled “Thought of Buddha-nature as Depicted in the LaṅkāvatāraSūtra” for the Ph.D. thesis.
Study on the Buddha-nature is a task which cannot be carried out without the important texts, teachings, practices and historical movements of Buddhism. This study is mainly based upon the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, a Buddhist text of the later period of the Tathāgatagarbha literature, in which the thought of the Buddha-nature is depicted in relationship with most of the Mahāyāna concepts such as the Buddhatā, Tathāgatagarbha, Ālayavijñāna, Dharmakāya, Mind-only, etc. Especially, the Laṅkāvatārasūtra emphasizes the practice of self-realization and sudden enlightenment of the Buddha-nature. It is also said that the Sūtra was handed down by Bodhidharma to his heir disciple Hui-ke 慧可 as the proof of enlightenment in Chan (Zen) Buddhism.
      This thesis is an attempt to investigate and criticize the philosophical and religious thought of the Buddha-nature as depicted in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra. In so doing, we have taken into consideration the following principle themes:

      1. Evolution of the Buddha-nature Concept
      2. The Buddha-nature in the Tathāgatagarbha Literature
      3. The Laṅkāvatārasūtra and Hindu Philosophy
      4. The Thought of Buddha-nature in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra
      5. The Practice of Buddha-Nature in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra
      6. Further Development of the Concept of Buddha-nature in
          China

      Structurally, therefore, excluding the introduction and conclusion, the thesis consists of six major chapters in accordance with the above six main themes respectively.